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Though Foucault was intrigued by the possibilities of radical social transformation, he 
resolutely resisted the idea that such transformation could escape the effects of power and 
expressed caution when it came to the question of revolution.  In this article we argue that in 
one particularly influential line of development of Foucault’s work his exemplary caution has 
been exaggerated in a way that weakens the political aspirations of post-Foucauldian 
scholarship.  The site of this reduction is a complex debate over the role of normativity in 
Foucauldian research, where it has been claimed that Foucault’s genealogical approach is 
unable to answer the question ‘Why Fight?’.  The terms of this debate (on the neo-
Foucauldian side) are limited by a dominant though selective interpretation of Foucault’s 
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analytics of power, where power is understood primarily in terms of government, rather than 
struggle.  In response we suggest that if we reconfigure power-as-government to power-as-
war, this adjusts the central concern. ‘Why Fight?’ becomes replaced by the more immediate 
question, ‘How Fight?’.  Without denying the obvious benefits of cautious scholarly work, we 
argue that a reconfiguration of Foucault’s analytics of power might help Foucauldian research 
to transcend the self-imposed ethic of political quietism that currently dominates the field. 
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We reproach this world not for going to war too ferociously, nor for trying to 
prevent it by all means; we only reproach it for reducing war to its most 
empty and worthless forms. (Tiqqun, 2010: 59) 
 
Cigar in hand Jacques Lacan looks on as a young man pours water over his desk.  It is 13 
October 1972.  Outwardly calm, Lacan encourages the man to explain what he hoped to 
achieve by interrupting the lecture.  ‘To make revolution’ is the reply.  This moment, he 
declares, has been chosen to denounce intellectuals who preach its impossibility, providing a 
rationale for their own political acquiescence.  The interruption is instructive on two counts:  
First, it dramatizes a difference in comportment between the would-be revolutionary who 
acts, and the intellectual who stands by to observe, transforming moments of action to points 
of reflection.  Second, the heckler takes issue with the potential effects of Lacan’s ideas rather 
than with their internal consistency.  This article adopts a similar strategy, which it applies to 
the work and legacy of a different thinker.  This article is an investigation into the political 
effects of Michel Foucault’s work.  As is well known, Foucault, like the young man in 
question, had his own critique of the intellectual.  Foucault’s critique is similar in that it, too, 
takes issue with the problem of intellectual detachment (Foucault, 1977a). We claim, 
nevertheless, that despite Foucault’s best efforts, the young revolutionary might well judge 
Foucault or at least his present-day followers to be deserving of the same watery treatment. 
 
The critical challenge 
 
We claim that in the political climate of our present, Foucault’s ideas have been largely 
emptied of their political force.  In part, this is because they were designed to respond to the 
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pressures of a very different context.  When Foucault (1998[1976a]: 82) established his 
‘analytics of power’ in the 1970s he was responding to the critical challenges of that decade.  
Take, for example, his discussion with Maoists on the topic of popular justice (Foucault, 
1980a[1972a]).  In this discussion, Foucault’s analytic caution comes across as an essential 
counter to militant presumption, and yet Foucault remains open to the possibility of 
revolutionary change.  For instance, whilst his interlocutor speculates that the liquidation of 
bosses in a country the size of France might not be practical, and that popular justice requires 
the careful guidance of a revolutionary court, Foucault patiently explains that the Maoists are 
already assuming too much.  Their problem is more fundamental.  The structure of a court, 
the idea of a neutral third party, the processes of power and enforcement, and the reference to 
a ‘universal’ idea of justice, are all embedded in the old order.  In making uncritical use of 
such devices, the revolutionary state apparatus will unwittingly extend and support elements 
of the regime that it sought to overthrow.  To prevent such mistakes, revolutionary terror, if it 
can be supported at all, requires better calibration.  
 
To speak of ‘calibrating terror’ looks odd almost half a century later, if not offensive 
to good taste.  When it comes to revolution, the bitter flavours left by a century of political 
experimentation have bred a delicate appetite.  As Slavoj Žižek (2007a: viii) argues when 
speaking about the French Revolution: almost everyone, ‘today’s “radical Left” included, is 
now somehow ashamed of the Jacobin legacy of revolutionary terror with its state-centralized 
character’.  Those who seek to reform the Left so that it may regain some measure of political 
effectiveness tend to favour ‘free interaction’ and ‘multiple subjectivities’ against the 
‘centralized hierarchy’ and singular Truth of a Jacobin-styled revolution (ibid.).  Pluralised, 
piecemeal and peaceable, these are the only methods of refusal conceivable today, unless, 
that is, you live outside the liberal-democratic West.
1
  Back home, anything radical, 
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disruptive or potentially violent is to be deplored.  For Žižek this disposition means that the 
contemporary Left concedes its own defeat before it has got its boots on.   
 
To succeed, a revolution must be fundamental in its reach, so the argument goes.  In 
what appears to be a deliberate attempt to upset liberal-left sensibilities Žižek (2007b: 195) 
claims that revolutions have failed hitherto not because they were ‘too extreme’ but because 
they ‘did not question their own presuppositions’ adequately enough.  As we have seen, 
Foucault (2002a[1977b]: 123) would presumably agree here with Žižek, having argued 
himself that one can ‘perfectly well conceive of revolutions that leave essentially untouched 
the power relations that form the basis of the functioning of the state’.  Indeed, communist 
regimes may well have ‘reinvested the very power-mechanisms constituted by the capitalist 
State’.  In part, for Foucault, this was because ‘the problem of the mechanics of power or the 
mechanisms of power [was not adequately] posed or analysed’ (Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 261).  
Radical, emancipatory theory failed to anticipate these reactionary outcomes because of its 
tendency to reduce the complexities of power to simplistic relations of domination and 
exploitation. 
 
It has been claimed that Foucault’s position with regard to revolution was so exacting 
that it announced (and even affirmed) the disappearance of revolution and the onset of a 
‘post-revolutionary’ age.  This is the view, indeed, of Foucault’s former student, collaborator 
and de facto executor of his intellectual estate, François Ewald.  In the 1970s, so the story 
goes, Foucault correctly identified a change in the consciousness of time.  This 
transformation took us beyond history, to an ‘end of history’ in which time was converted 
‘into a sort of infinite space’, becoming an ‘eternal present’ where one ‘just keeps oneself 
busy, because nothing more can happen’ (Ewald, 1999: 85-6).  Whilst Ewald’s description of 
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our present is certainly recognisable, it is nevertheless problematic in Ewald’s hands.  This 
diagnosis of his is matched to a personal career in which a former Maoist of the ’68 
generation has come to terms with failure by abandoning all revolutionary hope and 
explaining its impossibility through an ‘antirevolutionary’ interpretation of Foucault’s work 
(see Behrent, 2010).   
 
Whilst our ‘eternal present’ does indeed present a distinct challenge to revolutionary 
action, we claim that Foucault provides some of the tools required to tackle it.  Admittedly, 
these tools were developed in opposition to the polarising and reductive effects of 
revolutionary discourse as it appeared to Foucault in the early 1970s.  However, these tools 
were also designed to supersede this problematic discourse.  Foucault challenged the Marxist 
tendency to overly reductive denunciations of power, not simply in order to sensitise political 
analysis, but also to broaden the scope of political struggle.   Recovering ex-Marxists such as 
Ewald tend to emphasise the opportunities Foucault afforded to political analysis rather than 
those he afforded to struggle. 
  
As is well known, Foucault (2000a[1971a]: 369) recommended a profusion of ‘grey, 
meticulous, and patiently documentary’ investigations.  These investigations would not 
consider society as a whole and then recommend universal solutions, for “the whole of 
society’ is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be 
destroyed’ (Foucault, 1980b[1971b]: 233).  In other words, speaking at this level of 
abstraction generates a form of analytic blindness that allows old forms of power to be 
smuggled through, including the tyrannical notion that society can be ordered according to a 
single unifying law.  Since power is radically dispersed and locally contingent its overthrow 
‘does not, then, obey the law of all or nothing’.  Power is ‘not acquired once and for all by a 
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new control of the apparatuses nor by a new functioning or a destruction of the institutions’ 
(Foucault, 1991[1975a]: 27).  The revolutionary challenge is to unveil power and overthrow 
it in all its dispersion and specificity. 
 
The analytic consequences of this position can be summarised like this:  1. When 
power is seen as widely dispersed rather than located in one particularly powerful and 
coercive institution, this diminishes the importance of the question of legitimacy in analyses 
of power since no one agent or group of agents can be held accountable.  2. Once power is 
believed to be operating throughout society rather than emanating from the centre, this acts to 
disarm any theory of politics and power based on opposition to the state.  3. Although this 
approach bears some similarities to critical theory, according to which ‘instrumental 
rationality’ has spread throughout Western societies killing off ethical rationalities, Foucault 
does not see a single, uniform strain of this rationality.  Instead, he identifies a range of local 
and contingent rationalities.  This theoretical switch changes the perceived role of intellectual 
or critic.  Without reference to a dominant principle or underlying rationale, critique can no 
longer adopt the ‘premise of a deduction that concludes, ‘this, then, is what needs to be done” 
(Foucault, 2002b[1978a]: 236).  To make such recommendations would demand precisely the 
sort of global and unitary view that is no longer deemed possible.  
 
Foucault did, nevertheless, successfully maintain a critical ethos that was able to 
operate outside of conventional politics.  This ethos was combined with a definite refusal to 
translate his work into the terms of political debate:  
 
The Communist or Socialist Parties have never put on their working agenda 
the analysis of the power of reason over unreason [which was Foucault’s 
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early research agenda].  Perhaps that is not their job.  But if it isn’t their 
problem, theirs is not necessarily mine either. (Foucault, 2002c[1978b]: 286, 
parenthesis added) 
 
As a critical intellectual with a growing reputation, Foucault was desperate to avoid 
becoming the ‘alter ego, double, or alibi’ of any existing party or social movement (ibid.: 
288).  Here one can measure the success of Foucault’s work by the distance it maintains not 
only from mainstream politics, but also from the conventions of a more radical politics, from 
the received wisdom of those seeking to overthrow political systems according to theories of 
society that Foucault would argue are embedded in and thus bound up with the systems they 
seek to replace.  
 
Aiming to operate without the security of foundational claims Foucault developed a 
mode of enquiry to match his ethos.  As Thomas Lemke (2011: 29) observes, critique is 
usually limited to a practice ‘characterized by deficit, dependency and distance’.  (1) It 
perceives ‘epistemological problems’ as cognitive errors requiring correction – it corrects 
deficits in understanding.  (2) It is dependent on something other than itself, a ‘normative 
infrastructure that specifies its lawful foundation and its legitimate objective’.  (3) It 
establishes a system of distance, creating an opposition between ‘those who know and those 
who do not’ (ibid.: 29-30).    
 
As we explain below, Foucault transformed the critical enterprise by (1) exploring the 
frameworks imposed on the production of knowledge and the operations of power; (2) 
relating each normative infrastructure to its historical genesis in regimes of knowledge and 
power; and (3) working within these normative frameworks in order to render them unstable, 
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liable to collapse, and open to reconstruction on different terms by those who were once 
subjected to them.   
 
If we are to believe Foucault’s occasional and more obviously militant remarks, this 
determination to localise and particularise problems, to eschew legislative statements and 
political allegiances, to avoid in other words the usual tendencies of critique, does not reduce 
the critical enterprise, as if by default, to a weakened state.   Foucault speaks of his desire to 
‘break through that rigid yet fragmented crust’ formed by the dogmas and ‘endless 
discussions’ of intellectual debate, and his desire for a ‘personal, physical, and real 
involvement’ in political events (Foucault, 2002c[1978b]: 281-2).  Foucault was indeed no 
stranger to political protest, direct action, police brutality, arrest and deportation (see, for 
example, Macey, 1993: 205, 226, 270, 312, 341-352). With his own conduct in mind, 
Foucault argued that those who oppose the police must ‘not allow them the hypocrisy of 
masking physical force behind orders which have to be obeyed immediately’ (Foucault cited 
in ibid.: 350).  He confessed admiration for practical revolutionaries, most famously 
commenting on the Iranian Revolution of 1978.  This revolutionary moment was, in his view, 
praiseworthy for being relatively unencumbered by revolutionary expertise, by that ‘gigantic 
effort to domesticate revolts within a rational and controllable history’ (Foucault, 
2002d[1979a]: 450).  The Tunisian revolts of 1968 had a similar quality, in which, for 
Foucault, the ‘Marxist education of the Tunisian students was not very deep’ but their level 
of understanding ‘wasn’t essential’ (Foucault, 2002c[1978b]: 280).  Theoretical ‘exactness’ 
or subtlety was not necessary for a revolt animated by desire, myth and spirituality, in which 
practical decisions were located in the ‘logic of events’ (Osborne, 1999: 51).   
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The point to note is that Foucault was not only prepared to engage directly with Marx 
(see Choat, 2010), he was also willing to engage with certain forms of Marxism.  Here the 
crucial factor in Foucault’s appraisal of Marxist discourse was his estimation of the 
productivity of the relationship between Marxist theory and the accompanying logic of 
events.  Foucault contrasts the ‘vehemence and intensity’ of appeals to Marxism in Tunisia, 
to the Marxism he experienced in France, in which the revolutionary impulse is reduced to 
the format of ‘cold academic discussion’.  After May 1968 these discussions fragmented into 
a ‘proliferation of theories’, into an ‘irrepressible discursivity’ that was far removed, in his 
view, from the practical impulses of revolt (Foucault, 2002c[1978b]: 280-1).  The practical-
intellectual task, one might interpret, was to help shape an ‘enthusiasm for the Revolution’ 
(Foucault, 1983b: 18) by bringing into question all that appears ‘universal, necessary, 
obligatory’ (Foucault, 2000b[1984a]: 315) without then crushing such enthusiasm under the 
weight of cold academic discussion.  
 
The challenges Foucault faced are, however, no longer our own.  If Žižek is correct in 
suggesting that pluralised, piecemeal and peaceable political interventions are the only forms 
of revolt still acceptable for the majority on the Left today, it becomes clear that the political 
context for critical theoretical work has radically altered.  It could be argued that Foucault’s 
strategic position as it has been translated into the terms of neo-Foucauldian scholarship, 
finds itself complicit in this overall retreat of the Left.  This would be because it continues to 
adopt a fastidiously restrained scholarly stance designed for a radically different context; a 
context in which the organised Left was still a force to be reckoned with.  In mimicry of 
Foucault’s most analytically cautious tendencies, this scholarship has been prolific in its 
output, and yet, the weight of these enquiries is no longer placed against the forces of a 
widespread, organised militancy and its associated intellectual vanguard to which the neo-
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Foucauldian could respond with a derisive laugh.  We are no longer faced with the theoretical 
globalisms of a widespread Marxism.  Consequently any attempt to revive a project that 
replaces ‘universal’ with ‘specific intellectuals’ (Foucault, 2002a[1977b]: 127), for example, 
makes far less sense now that the Left has been so successfully released from intellectual grip 
of ‘universalist’ Marxism.  The problem is that political problems are today almost entirely 
posed in specific, that is to say, immediate terms.   Yet the most urgent political (and social 
and cultural) problems of the present are framed within a global context.  Specificity alone 
fails to address the scale of the challenge presented. 
 
The Foucault Effect 
 
There is a notable tendency in the work of Foucault’s many followers to translate his analytic 
caution (which as we have seen was the product of a very different context) into a latter-day 
form of political quietism.  This tendency is most obvious in the grouping that was 
announced by and through The Foucault Effect (Burchell et al., 1991) – the influence of 
which was recently celebrated at The Foucault Effect 1991-2011 conference at Birkbeck 
College in London – and has been expressed most consistently but not exclusively through 
articles published in the journal Economy and Society, based at the London School of 
Economics.  Prominent figures include Peter Miller, Nikolas Rose, and Thomas Osborne.  
Indicative texts include those by Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996), Ashenden and Owen 
(1999), Dean (1999, 2007), Miller and Rose (2008), Rose (1999a, 1999b) and Rose, 
O’Malley and Valverde (2006).  These authors wear their refusal to make normative – i.e. 
political – judgements as a badge of distinction.  They celebrate the fact that they developed a 
mode of analysis that ‘kept its distance from the rhetorics of social critique’ (Rose et al., 
2006: 90, our emphasis).   
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This tendency to translate Foucault’s analytic caution into political quiescence is not, 
in our view, limited to this largely British grouping.  It can be observed in the work of many 
‘Western’ scholars across parts of continental Europe, Australia and North America, and is 
particularly prominent within traditions of neo-Foucauldian scholarship that work from the 
problematic of ‘governmentality’.  Far more is at stake here than the quietism of a relatively 
small group of scholars working with Foucault and with the problematic of government.  As 
these scholars themselves recognise, the ‘concepts and methodological choices utilized in 
governmentality studies’ spread so far, and with such notable success precisely because they 
‘resonated’ so well ‘with concurrent intellectual trends in a number of relatively independent 
fields’.  This gave ‘the notion of governmentality and the research questions and perspectives 
associated with it traction across numerous disciplines, institutions, and geographical 
locations’ (ibid.: 92).  It is worth asking, in response, what exactly it was that secured this 
rapid spread, and widespread adoption, causing such a wide range of institutions and 
disciplines to willingly accept these methodological (and for us also political) dogmas? 
 
Our enquiry focuses on ‘the Foucault effect’ that has occurred within the intellectual 
contexts of those polities that define themselves as liberal democracies, which is to say, those 
societies in which radical Left social analyses have been in decline.  Elsewhere in, say, a 
post-colonial context such as Latin America, Foucault may have been taken up very 
differently (see, for example, Trigo, 2002).  We argue that in the particular social and 
historical contexts of these ‘Western’ democracies, a neo-Foucauldian ethic of research has 
come to dominate.  In addition to the painstakingly descriptive and politically cautious 
approaches to researching power, government and subjectivity that characterise this tradition, 
some scholars within this loose grouping deliberately neglect their master theorist, as if 
undue reference to Foucault risks transforming a project that should meticulously uncover 
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and describe the micro-operations of power into a project defined by the sort of theoretical 
conformity from which they are at pains to distance themselves.  Nikolas Rose (1999a: ix) 
declares that it was a ‘deliberate decision’ to let his debt to Foucault remain ‘implicit’.  
Writing with Peter Miller, we find how they ‘preferred not to be Foucault scholars’ (Miller 
and Rose, 2008: 8), advocating ‘a relation to his work that is looser, more inventive and more 
empirical’ (Rose, 1999b: 5). After all, was this not what Foucault sometimes did to Nietzsche 
and also to an extent Marx?
2
  He let them labour in the background and largely out of sight.  
The true Foucauldian, we are led to believe, does the same with Foucault.   
 
When scholars reference Foucault more directly we encounter a recurring fear that 
they might nevertheless ‘pin Foucault down’ through an overly tidy explication of his thought 
(Huffer, 2010: 332).  It is as if any strong statement about Foucault, or an aspect of his work, 
would automatically translate his ideas into a totalising discourse.  And so attempts are made 
to speak about Foucault ‘without ever producing a definitive object we call “Foucault”’ 
(ibid.).  Known as the ‘author function’ (Foucault, 2000c[1969a]: 211) this type of reductive 
operation has been successfully avoided by many scholars.  Those explications of Foucault’s 
oeuvre that do exist often begin with an apology, stating that overviews are impossible, 
particularly with Foucault, and that they risk exercising a restraint upon his work.  Whilst this 
determination to avoid pinning Foucault down makes intrinsic sense (where the intention is to 
encourage the proliferation of Foucault’s ideas rather than impose upon them the constraints 
of received interpretations of his work), this effort to keep Foucault open so as to maintain 
the versatility, productivity and indeed fecundity of his work, has become an dogma of its 
own.  For example, the suggestion that Foucault had a militant streak that has been much 
neglected in recent work is swiftly rejected as the misguided project of those who would 
impose a biographical constraint upon his work.   This is not our intention.  We are 
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concerned, nevertheless, by the effects of a dominant intellectual trend within Foucauldian 
scholarship that promotes an, as it were, undetermined, diffuse Foucault, an intellectual 
figure whose loosely assembled writing can be visited and savoured for its happily 
disengaged temper, and insists on a correspondingly unsystematised proliferation of his work 
and ideas.  For us, this insistence that the convenient adaptability and flexibility of 
Foucauldian analysis ‘is to be celebrated’ (Rose et al., 2006: 100) is self-defeating, since this 
pursuit of a ‘looser’ relationship to Foucault’s work, dropping in on it from time to time to 
borrow an insight or deploy a concept, has itself become overbearing.  In many cases it has 
become the only normative principle that can be advanced by those wishing to remain within 
the field of Foucauldian scholarship. 
 
The overall difficulty with this fealty to Foucault’s theoretical endeavour is that its 
predilection for patiently descriptive theoretical investigations incurs a retreat from clear 
statements about possibilities for political action, and fosters a growing detachment from any 
impulse for change.  From a fear of bold pronouncements – as if any revealed political 
commitment will betray a lack of intellectual sophistication, doing violence to Foucault’s 
thought, constraining the supple productiveness of his ideas, translating them at the very 
worst into epochal and totalising claims – theorists of this tradition learn to restrain their own 
impulses in what might be viewed, with some irony, as an exemplary case of self-
government.  More succinctly: a fear of betraying Foucault’s critical ethos has bred a 
fastidious and overly refined theoretical appetite.  
 
We argue that, given our changed political climate it may be worth returning to and 
re-evaluating the choices Foucault once made when defining what is now a highly influential 
analytic frame.  This paper focuses on the theoretical and strategic realignment that occurred 
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during Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in 1976 (Foucault, 2004[1976b]).  These 
lectures mark the transition from his conception of power-as-war to the revised (and now 
dominant) framework of power-as-government.  In what follows, we examine the possibility 
for a return to the analytic of power-as-war and argue that such a manoeuvre would restore to 
Foucauldian work that once productive dissonance between militancy and scholarly caution. 
 
Frameworks of power 
 
To understand Foucault’s political stance, and explore possibilities for retrieving his 
thought’s radicalism, it is necessary to revisit the ways in which Foucault subverted 
conventional understandings of power, looking in particular at the options he explored, and 
the strategic choices he made whilst developing his approach.  His lectures at the Collège de 
France in 1976 represent for us a brief but important moment, pregnant with possibilities that 
were left largely unexplored.  During these lectures, the metaphor of war or warlike struggle 
as a framework for understanding power is briefly foregrounded before it retreats behind later 
conceptualisations.  In the years that followed Foucault shifted emphasis from war to the 
metaphor of government.  This afforded several crucial advantages in the analysis of power, 
and these advances are certainly ones that we would not wish to discard.  In what follows we 
explore this transition, outline its consequences, and argue for a return to the analytic of war 
as a way of investing with new energy the multiple insights that have been gained through the 
analytic of government. 
 
In the first lecture Foucault contrasts ‘two great systems for analysing power’, the 
framework of ‘contract-oppression’ and its rival, the schema of ‘war-repression’ (Foucault, 
2004[1976b]: 17).  The first conception of power as ‘contract-oppression’ entails questions 
such as:  What is a legitimate exercise of power?  How should we establish checks and 
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balances to restrict power, to prevent legitimate power from degenerating and becoming 
oppressive?  By contrast, the second conception, which seeks to analyse power in terms of 
war-repression, does not concern itself with juridical questions of legitimacy.  Here, 
repression ‘is not what oppression was in relation to the contract, namely an abuse’.  On the 
contrary, repression is simply the experience of a ‘perpetual relationship of force’ from which 
there is no escape into the neutral realms of legitimate power (ibid.). 
 
Foucault locates his early work within the ‘struggle-repression schema’ (ibid.), 
though he immediately separates the two terms in this pairing.  On repression Foucault 
provides the following clarification:  In his History of Madness, it was sufficient to think of 
power as something that represses (Foucault, 2009a[1961]).  Before the nineteenth century 
‘power was exercised over madness primarily in the form of exclusion’ and thus madness 
was a ‘privileged case’ (Foucault, 1996a[1977c]: 207).  Nevertheless, we find that Foucault 
had ‘long been suspicious of this notion of “repression”’ (Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 17).  It was 
through an interest in prisons and sexuality that Foucault was prompted to look beyond 
power-as-repression and develop an analysis of its more ‘positive’ and productive effects 
(Foucault, 1996[1977c]: 207).  Indeed, one could say that Discipline and Punish, published in 
1975, marks his conceptual transition from repressive to productive power (Foucault, 
1998[1976a]).  During a lecture delivered one year later the productive aspects of his account 
of the prison are given far greater prominence (Foucault, 2009b[1976c]), and by the time of 
his first book on sexuality in 1976 the repressive hypothesis was under sustained attack 
(Foucault, 1998[1976a]).  
 
So what about war, the other half of his war-repression schema?  Here Foucault 
(2004[1976b]: 18) remains ambivalent in the first few lectures of 1976.  In subsequent 
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commentaries, this ambivalence on the question of war is rarely noted, or if it is noted, it is 
assumed that this ambivalence is the product of an intellectual crisis that was later overcome 
(e.g. Patton, 2013).  As we outline below, there seems to have been a retrospective tendency 
to assume that during the 1976 lectures Foucault introduced a warlike interpretation of power 
purely in order to reject it (i.e. by drawing attention to its dangers).   Readers of Foucault-
inspired research are then reminded that once Foucault returned from his sabbatical in 1978 
he preferred to think of power in governmental terms.  According to this view, the 1976 
lectures become nothing but a point of transition from power-as-discipline to power-as-
government. 
 
The problem with this perspective is that the lectures of 1976 are, in effect, 
misunderstood.  This reading presumes that power-as-war was not a candidate for serious 
conceptualisation – it was just an idea, a possibility that Foucault was exploring.  By contrast, 
we propose to draw attention to Foucault’s ambivalence at this point.  Whilst it is 
undoubtedly true that in subsequent lectures Foucault laid great emphasis on power-as-
government, or on a governmental interpretation of power, it is wrong to assume that 
Foucault passed from power-as-discipline to power-as-government, without seriously 
entertaining an analytic framework of power-as-war.  To the extent that Foucault ever 
rejected a warlike interpretation of power, this rejection only came later.  
 
In the lectures Foucault poses the following questions:  ‘Are we really talking about 
war when we analyze the workings of power?  Are the notions of “tactics,” “strategy,” and 
“relations of force” valid?’  Should we invert that well-known statement attributed to Carl 
von Clausewitz (1997[1832]) where war is described as a ‘continuation of politics by other 
means’?  Would it not be better to ask whether ‘politics is the continuation of war by other 
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means’ (Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 15)?  If some sort of ‘permanent war’ is in operation, what is 
the nature of this struggle that persists beneath the ‘calm order’ of our day-to-day lives (ibid.: 
46-7)?  Referring to ‘class struggle’ as the typical response to this last question, Foucault 
later declares that what he finds ‘striking’ is how Marxists tend to ‘pass over in silence what 
is understood by struggle’ (Foucault, 1980c[1977d]: 208).  By contrast, these lectures would 
examine what he calls ‘Nietzsche’s hypothesis’, the idea that at the ‘basis of the power-
relationship’ is ‘a warlike clash between forces’ (Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 16).  The type of 
war metaphor that Foucault has in mind here is the metaphor of civil war or insurgency 
where direct confrontations between amassed forces are rare.  Foucault viewed grandiose 
accounts of power – accounts influenced by the metaphor of a clearly defined battlefield of 
opponents – as inappropriate, proposing instead to explore struggle in all its terrestrial and 
contradictory detail.   
 
Foucault’s appeal to a specific model of war in these lectures remains, for all its 
analytic possibilities, inconclusive.  Despite his focus on the warlike skirmish in all its 
localised, aleatory and uncodified forms, that is, despite his appeal to a metaphor of warlike 
relations that must be contrasted to grander depictions of amassed forces and great 
repressions; what Foucault does not offer in his comparatively brief analysis is an exploration 
of how the analytic of war is to be decoupled from a repressive conceptualisation of power in 
the war-repression schema.  For anyone wishing to develop Foucault’s insights on war, this 
remains a problem to be addressed.  In the first lecture, the audience is told that the ‘problem 
of war in civil society’ will be one that Foucault can only ‘begin’ to examine this year and 
may be working on for ‘years to come’ (ibid.: 18).  As we now know, this project was soon 
abandoned.   
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From power-as-war to power-as-government 
 
Three months after his last lecture in March 1976, Foucault (2002a[1977b]: 124) remarks that 
it is ‘astonishing to see how easily and self-evidently people talk of warlike relations of 
power or of class struggle without ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant, 
and if so what form’.3  By 1978, he was less equivocal, now complaining that ‘discussions on 
political subjects are parasitized by the model of war’ (Foucault, 2002c[1978b]: 297).  One 
difficulty with war as a cipher for power is that it threatens to polarise discussion.  We are 
tempted to think in terms of victors and vanquished, oppressors and oppressed in a way that 
purges analysis of any subtlety and useful insight.  Thus Foucault later explains that instead 
‘of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism” - ‘a relationship that 
is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that 
paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation’ (Foucault, 2002e[1982]: 342).  Here 
Foucault qualifies, but nevertheless retains a concept of warlike flux in his conception of 
power.  It is now, though, subsumed within his notion of power as ‘a question of 
“government”’ (ibid.  341). 
 
Another problem with power-as-war can be derived from Foucault’s remarks on 
violence:  When ‘we speak of violence, and this is what bothers me about the notion, we 
always have in mind a kind of connotation of physical power’ which ‘allows one to think that 
good power’ is power that is ‘not permeated by violence, is not physical power’ (Foucault, 
2006[1974]: 14).  Foucault was at pains to demonstrate that the violence of power could at 
the same time be rational, calculated and controlled.   
 
It would appear to us that there are two potential options when seeking to break down 
the dichotomy between violent and ‘reasonable’ power.  One option, following Nietzsche 
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(1998a[1886]: I, §2), is to explain how one thing can ‘arise from its opposite’ (truth from 
error, reason from violence etc.).  This is not to make an ontological claim about power or 
reason (e.g. ‘power and reason are essentially warlike’).  The provocation – war is the origin 
of reason – is simply a device to help us escape equating power with the absence of reason, or 
reason with the absence of power.  One could argue that this was Foucault’s strategy in 1976. 
The other option is to travel outside the dichotomy and find a third term.  Taking war as the 
metaphor for violent power, and the juridical contract as the metaphor for ‘reasonable’ 
power, Foucault would, as we have seen, later opt for a third term, that of government, which 
would allow him to escape the troubling binary.   
 
Foucault developed this governmental theme in his lectures of 1978 and 1979.  By the 
end of the twentieth century this had spawned an influential and prolific body of research 
which we describe, for the sake of brevity, as ‘the governmentality approach’.4  Within this 
loose grouping, it is now axiomatic that ‘the relationship proper to power’ should be sought 
‘not on the side of violence or struggle…but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of 
action, neither warlike nor juridical, that of government’ (Foucault, 2002e[1982]: 341).  
Playing on the double meaning in French of the verb conduire which means to lead or drive, 
and se conduire which means to behave or conduct oneself, it follows Foucault’s suggestion 
that power is all about the ‘conduct of conducts’.  Power is ‘less a confrontation between two 
adversaries’ than a ‘question of “government”’.  ‘To govern, in this sense, is to structure the 
possible field of action of others’ (ibid.).  This conception takes us right from the macro-
government of states down to the micro-government of communities, families, children, souls 
and so on.  
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In abandoning the notion of power as a kind of violence, and opting for a third term, 
that of government, there has been an important, and to our minds politically detrimental shift 
in emphasis.  In 1976 Foucault was explicit in noting how something can arise from its 
opposite, how structures can be ‘built on top of this web of bodies, accidents, and passions, 
this seething mass which is sometimes murky and sometimes bloody’ (Foucault, 
2004[1976b]: 54).  Here in Foucault’s work there was perhaps a convergence between the 
influence of Nietzsche (1998b[1887]: II §3) ‘how much blood and horror is at the bottom of 
all “good things”’ and Marx (1990[1890]: 926) ‘capital comes dripping from head to toe, 
from every pore, with blood and dirt’.  This emphasis retains within view the continued 
violence of power even when it becomes codified in governmental devices.  It is a 
perspective on the nature of power that perpetually incites radical critique, rousing the 
theorist who holds this view from intellectualised detachment.  Yet today’s governmental 
analysts diligently avoid bold and incendiary proclamations as if reference to the violence of 
power would betray a lack of sophistication. With violence suppressed, the importance of 
struggle beneath systems of government is given little attention, and the possibility of an 
equally violent response is silenced.
5
   
 
Mitchell Dean speaks of governmental genealogy as ‘endogenous to a political 
system, and practised in a time of limited political adversity’ (1999: 45). This characterisation 
of the political context in which genealogy operates is curious, but it is an understanding that 
is shared by, is central to, the governmental analyses of those neo-Foucauldian researchers 
who, in his view, form a ‘new sub-discipline within the social sciences and humanities’ 
(ibid.: 2). What is curious here is the notion of ‘limited political adversity’, a condition 
which, it is clearly implied, obtains in advanced liberal democracies. The term may indeed be 
justly descriptive of the limited possibilities for active political dissent that typify such 
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societies, the restrictions that liberal government (in its fullest sense, involving its synergetic 
relationship with capitalism) places on adversarial politics, but it is surely very complacent 
concerning the violences of this ‘reasonable’ power system. For Dean ‘[L]imited political 
adversity’ is just something to be accepted and whose parameters one is obliged to work 
within. It is this complacency that we critique in this paper and which we seek to disturb by 
re-evaluating the notion of power-as-war. We share Mitchell's unease with ‘the prophetic and 
apocalyptic tone’ of much social and political theory but have no problem with such theory's 
recognition of the persistence, in varied forms, of struggle in the management of human 
affairs and the violences that are enacted under the banner of liberal democracy. These are 
the necessary recognitions that are all too often invisible in the analyses of governmental 
researchers.   
 
In tune with his subsequently less martial interpretation of power, Foucault’s earlier 
interest in power-as-war has received very little attention.  The dominant position seems to be 
to accept without question the merit of Foucault’s own shift in emphasis away from power-
as-war.  When power-as-war is mentioned, it is swiftly rejected as an experimental dead-end 
that was discarded on the way to a better understanding of power, as government (Dean, 
1999: 25).  More detailed investigation has done little to upset this balance (see Pasquino, 
1993), allowing a Foucauldian mainstream to maintain its view that power-as-war has little to 
offer - or that what it does offer is of a purely negative order.  Within this view Foucault’s 
interest in power-as-war is located somewhere between an irrelevance and a potentially 
dangerous misjudgement. 
 
The 1976 lectures 
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Foucault’s later playing down of the strikingly prominent war metaphor in the 1976 lectures 
is not the only reason why we might be encouraged to dismiss it.  There is a more immediate 
difficulty located in the very structure of the 1976 lectures.  Here Foucault’s treatment of the 
war metaphor is complicated by his overlapping methodological and historical attachments.   
 
Literature dealing with the lectures of 1976 is relatively sparse and tends to focus on 
the more prominent historical narrative contained within them.  See for example the work 
collected by Morton and Bygrave (2008).  Marks (2000: 135) provides a rare exception when 
he argues that the ‘unstated dynamic’ of these lectures is their methodological content.  
However, Marks is quick to adopt the conventional line in dismissing Foucault’s 
methodological interest in power-as-war as a mistake that is beyond redemption.  For us, 
these methodological attachments are, roughly speaking, genealogical in the sense outlined 
by Allen (2014).  They have, nevertheless, been obscured by the more obvious historical 
narrative of the lectures.  In summary, these two positions are as follows: 
 
Methodology: These lectures rework the concept of power by addressing the ‘war’ element of 
the war-repression schema.  This level of interest is broadly speaking methodological in that 
Foucault sets out to investigate how a range of marginalised historical figures conceptualised 
power-as-war and investigated its effects.   
 
Historical narrative: In these lectures Foucault provides a tentative and experimental history 
of historiography.  He recalls a time when notions of war and struggle were used to 
conceptualise the past and contest the present.  He goes on to explain how in the nineteenth 
century this discourse was eventually co-opted and internalised by the modern state.  By 
implication, it would seem that to speak in terms of war today is to adopt an outmoded 
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discourse.  This discourse has been assimilated and thus no longer provides the resources 
upon which we can construct a critique of contemporary power.  Such, indeed, is the 
conclusion we arrive at if the second historical argument is taken as an epochal claim, and 
thereby allowed to eclipse the first methodological one.  We will explore this process of 
eclipse in more detail below.  
 
We recognise that the division we effect between the methodological and historical 
levels places us in danger of producing a simplifying reduction of Foucault’s argument, or it 
would if we were proposing that it revealed a damaging and invalidating split within his 
thought.  We have no such intentions.  Indeed, we accept that Foucault’s analytic framework 
often reflected his historical focus, which is why, for example, Foucault adjusted his analytic 
techniques away from a conception based on power as a repressive force (from power as 
something that is possessed by and concentrated in powerful individuals) when examining an 
historical period in which other, less centralised modes of power were becoming prominent.  
Foucault (2007a[1978d]: 107) was though perfectly explicit in stating that sovereign power 
was not replaced by new techniques; it was reinvested alongside new developments in 
governmental management.  Perhaps surprisingly, Mitchell Dean (2007) has worked to 
rehabilitate the analysis of sovereignty in governmental theory.  We argue that there is a 
similar potential to rehabilitate a warlike conception of power, which does not automatically 
become redundant in an era that is perceived as increasingly ‘governmental’.  The difficulty, 
for us, is that Foucault’s historical analysis in the 1976 lecture series has overshadowed and 
thereby diminished the significance, the usefulness, of his methodological innovation in 
perceiving power in warlike terms.  And yet the neglected methodological focus of these 
lectures has, we argue, the potential to restore to Foucauldian critique what it has since lost, 
this being an uncomfortable but productive relationship with militancy. 
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Foucault’s history of historiography 
 
In the development of Foucault’s historical narrative we are presented with a tentative study 
of the historian.  Foucault identifies three phases in the writing of history.  His study begins 
by exploring historical discourse in its ceremonial function, where history was used to justify 
and reinforce existing power.  History would show how existing sovereigns were preordained 
with an indisputable right to rule by ‘extracting from’ all the ‘vicious and violent accidents 
[of the past] which are linked to error, a basic and permanent rationality which is, by its very 
essence, bound up with fairness and the good’ (Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 55). 
 
At various points in and around the seventeenth century another mode of re-telling the 
past began to emerge in the margins, where it remained until finally disappearing in the 
nineteenth century when it would be ‘denounced as the discourse of a biased and naive 
historian, a bitter politician, a dispossessed aristocracy, or as an uncouth discourse that puts 
forward inarticulate demands’ (ibid.: 58).  This was a form of ‘counterhistory’, where the 
implicit assumption that people and sovereign were one was dropped as histories of races 
began.  (‘Race’ is used here in its original French sense, meaning: ‘membership of the royal 
(and noble) families of the Middle Ages’.6)   
 
Within these rival historical narratives, the role of sovereign history was inverted and 
fragmented.  It was inverted because the vicious and violent accidents of the past were no 
longer linked to error; they were no longer explained away so as to reassert sovereign right.  
It was fragmented because history was now providing the source material for rival and 
contending accounts.  These accounts were ‘deployed within a history that has no boundaries, 
no end, and no limits’.  The ‘drabness’ of histories that were organised around ‘a few basic, 
 26 
stable principles’ was replaced by something more fiery and ephemeral (ibid.: 55).  Multiple 
histories were now told in support of rival factions that were laying claims to their respective 
legitimacy and importance.  These rival accounts might argue on behalf of a hitherto 
neglected but noble lineage, or they might tell a more discontinuous history that accounted 
for their current subjection.  There was no longer one history for all; rather, history became 
an oppositional tool by which the status quo could be challenged.  As forgotten struggles 
were unearthed, and as the ‘blood that has dried in the codes’ was rediscovered (ibid.: 56), 
these multiplying histories of races broke apart from the old homogenising history of the 
sovereign.   
 
Through a detailed study of historians such as Henri de Boulainvilliers, Foucault was 
able to show that these histories were not always simple tales of ‘victors and vanquished’.  At 
times they were far more finely drawn, analysing fluctuations of power, showing how sources 
of strength could become principles of weakness.  They were able to explain how ‘a certain 
relationship of force’ was slowly ‘and for obscure reasons, inverted’.  This led to ‘the 
emergence of a diversity of struggles’ and ‘shifting front lines’ as the analysis proceeded 
towards finer historical distinctions.  Larger struggles were ‘divided and transformed by 
multiple channels’.  The relationship of war became ‘part of every social relationship’ 
fragmenting into ‘thousands of different channels’, revealing war to be ‘a sort of permanent 
state that exists between groups’.  History now appeared as a ‘calculation of forces’ (ibid.: 
160-2), and historical discourse became a political device, having established in effect a form 
of ‘historico-political continuum’ where the recounting of history was ‘not simply a matter of 
describing a relationship of force’ - it was an attempt to adjust ‘current relations of force’ by 
interrupting present politics with revised historical understandings.  History thus became ‘a 
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knowledge of struggles’ that was deployed ‘within a field of struggles’.  There was now ‘a 
link between the political fight and historical knowledge’ (ibid.: 171). 
 
It is precisely this connection, where the discourse of historical struggle became tied 
to a political fight that Foucault was, in his own words, ‘praising’ (ibid.: 65).  Here Foucault 
expresses a methodological commitment: it is the function of history as an oppositional tool 
that he admires even though such discourse was used as a tool of rival nobilities, even 
though, as Foucault observes, it was often ‘basic, clumsy, and overloaded’, and contained 
‘the most insane hopes’ (ibid.: 56-7).  There is a certain attraction to the bold cut and thrust of 
these counterhistories and the reader of these lectures may well be disappointed to discover 
that during the nineteenth century, the counterhistory Foucault celebrates was transformed 
into something rather different, and this is where any praise of his comes to an abrupt halt.  
This discourse was co-opted and transformed in two important respects:   
 
(1) According to Foucault’s tentative genealogy, in the nineteenth century the multiplex 
discourse of struggle was reduced to the revolutionary idea that one final battle could end all 
struggles and result in utopia.  This, in effect, inaugurated the revolutionary modernism that 




(2) During a similar period rather than being recoded in class terms, as Marxist analysis 
might have wanted, counterhistory was recast as attempts were made to ‘recode the old 
counterhistory … in terms of races – races in the biological and medical sense of the term’.  
This ‘biologico-medical perspective’ crushed ‘the historical dimension that was present’ in 
the old discourse (ibid.: 80).
 
 Coupled to the idea of biological purity, this co-opted discourse 




).  Struggle was recast in terms of modern racist discourse, which redefines social 
groups in terms of the biological threat posed by them to overall biological purity and health.  
As a result, the older and distinctly pre-biological discourse of race war once employed by 
counterhistory was conceptually reconfigured as an ‘internal war that defends society against 
threats born of and in its own body’ (ibid.: 216).  In this switch from an ‘emancipatory 
project to a concern with purity’, struggle transformed into a fight for the overall well-being 
of a state, a biopolitical fight to preserve the state from impurity or contamination.  
Counterhistory, a political tool of rival and contending groups, was thereby turned back on 
the unruly and mutinous dispositions of those who had once forged it.  It was reduced to a 
tool of state, a rationale for removing ‘heterogeneous elements’ (ibid.: 81). 
 
So, to bring this to a conclusion, as one commentator and editor of Foucault observes: 
‘the lectures not only provided the promised historical celebration of militant thought but also 
exposed the limitations and immense dangers of that style of thought’ (Gordon, 2002: xxii).  
According to Patton (2013), this lecture series was intended by Foucault as a response to 
those on the Left who were now taking up arms (e.g. the assassinations and kidnappings 
carried out by groups such as the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction).  Hence 
Foucault’s genealogy of historical discourse, in which struggle is either reduced to 
revolutionary violence or internalised within discourses of state, is used to cast doubt on 
power-as-war as a methodological attachment.  It would seem, from this perspective, as if the 
militancy of the counterhistorical perspective is not to be trusted, since it is vulnerable to co-
option and likely to lead to an escalation in violence.  For us, whilst these observations are 
important, they still do not imply an absolute rejection of power-as-war.  Instead they invite 
us to investigate more precisely what we mean when we assert the necessary violence of 
power.  We are also invited to investigate the strategic consequences of taking such a 
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position.  For example, the following questions become pertinent: (i) to what extent must a 
form of power analysis that models itself on disparate struggles, inevitably find itself 
becoming reduced to a potentially tyrannical singularity; and (ii) to what extent might 
genealogical work which abjures militancy find itself becoming internalised within the 
systems and operations of control that flow through the social and which the state attempts to 
coordinate?   
 
These are both considerations that we should be aware of, serving to warn us that a 
form of power analysis which bases itself within a framework of power-as-war, can be co-
opted by repressive forces.  Whilst the lectures of 1976 do not constitute a rejection of power 
as war, in the years that followed there was certainly a subtle shift in Foucault’s approach to 
power.  This shift has nevertheless been magnified and distorted by those who insist on a 
rejection of the war metaphor.  We argue that through a close reading of the lectures it 
becomes less obvious that we should reject the framework of power as war out of hand.   
 
On ‘not being governed so much’  
 
It is, in our view, regrettable that Foucault’s sensitivity to the complacent assumptions of 
militant discourse has been translated, in the work of his followers, into a scholarly effort to 
purge critique of almost all normativity, as if any goal or direction, any normative 
commitment, however mild, would perpetuate a dangerous naivety.  Here the term 
‘normativity’ stands for any value-based commitment that has the pretence to universality.   
 
Whilst many normative commitments may appear trifling at first sight, those who 
adopt a strict Foucauldian line will remind us that normativities, however minor, often 
presume access to a trans-historical, evaluative position or figure (such as the figure of ‘man’ 
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- see Foucault, 1985[1966]).  This presumption affords those claiming access to this 
evaluative standpoint the unique but nevertheless illusory privilege of standing outside time 
and present context in order to pronounce a verdict upon the conditions of the present.  
Norms are also, following Foucault’s argument in Discipline and Punish, underwritten by 
disciplinary procedures that silently secure their acceptance (Foucault, 1991[1975a]).  In a 
biopolitical twist, norms are even now derived from the societies in which they are said to 
occur, helping naturalise normativities and hence raise them above critique (Foucault, 
2007a[1978d]).  Normativities are insidious to the Foucauldian, often subtle in their operation 
but monstrous in their effects. 
 
To adopt a normative commitment, so the argument goes, is to ‘subordinate oneself in 
the name of an external code, truth, authority or goal’ (Rose, 1999b: 283); it is to become 
unwittingly ‘hard-wired’ to a political perspective (Rose et al., 2006: 101).  According to 
those who subscribe to this (dominant) form of post-Foucauldianism, our normative 
commitments are always born of and limited by our present.  The oft-repeated purpose of 
Foucauldian analysis goes something like this: it is to expose and thereby destabilise the 
conceptual limits that define us in order that we may move beyond them.  According to this 
view, when normative conventions form the basis of critique a species of norm-induced 
blindness arrives, insulating us from the sort of radical decentring that is required if we are to 
fundamentally change the present.  Indeed, the notion of ‘critique’ itself has been rejected by 
members of this school of thought.  We are told that the Foucauldian genealogical approach 
offers ‘not critique’ but studies that are ‘critical’ in a different sense, in that they ‘identify and 
describe differences and hence…help to make criticism possible’ (ibid.: 101).  Though we 
share Foucault’s suspicion of totalising worldviews and their ‘claim to escape from the 
system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programmes of another society’ 
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(Foucault, 2000b[1984a]: 316), this methodological injunction to avoid normativities carries 
with it an oddly normative note of interdiction.   
 
As is well known, the debate concerning normativity attempts to adjudicate between a 
persistent critique of Foucault, made most tellingly by Jürgen Habermas, and those who 
claim that Foucault has been misunderstood.
9
  Habermas argued that without a normative 
foundation, Foucauldian critique is unable to answer the question ‘Why Fight?’.  Without a 
positive vision to work towards, it is unable to suggest why we should ‘muster any resistance 
at all’ (Habermas, 1994[1987]: 95).  Why not simply adapt to power instead?   
 
Whilst we believe that the case is far from closed, Habermas’s critique misfires to the 
extent that it is concerned with separating legitimate from illegitimate power so that one 
might pursue the former and resist the latter.  Foucault rejected this entire conceptual 
framework as wedded to a contractual conception of power.  This conception – ‘articulated 
around power [viewed] as a primal right that is surrendered, and which constitutes 
sovereignty’ – elevates the social contract as the ‘matrix of political power’ (Foucault, 
2004[1976b]: 16-17).   The contractual conception of power serves as a regulating idea, 
constraining discussions concerning power into normative questions of right, responsibility 
and obligation.  This conception of power is, from a Foucauldian point of view, unable to 
account for the multiple, entangled forms in which power manifests itself.  More importantly, 
by escaping the implicit normativities of contractual power, Foucault was able to gesture to 
more radical forms of political engagement.  Take, for example, these remarks from an 
interview in 1971:  
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[W]e can’t defeat the system through isolated actions; we must engage it on 
all fronts – the university, the prisons, and the domain of psychiatry – one 
after another since our forces are not strong enough for a simultaneous 
attack.  We strike and knock against the most solid obstacles; the system 
cracks at another point; we persist.  It seems that we’re winning, but then 
the institution is rebuilt; we must start again.  It is a long struggle; it is 
repetitive and seemingly incoherent.  But the system it opposes, as well as 
the power exercised through the system, supplies its unity.  (Foucault 
1980b[1971b]: 230)   
 
Evident here is an acknowledgement of the need for multiple struggles that together 
constitute a radically fragmented form of collective action. Here, in this quote, we find a 
sober recognition of the necessarily extended nature of this political fight, which must take 
account of the multiform and protean nature of power.  It is precisely this militant aspect that 
remains neglected in neo-Foucauldian work, where his accompanying critique of utopianism 
several lines later in the same interview (‘to imagine another system is to extend our 
participation in the present system’), is more regularly cited (ibid.). 
 
Whilst it is axiomatic amongst the defenders of Foucault to reject restrictive 
conceptions of power and guiding visions of the future as destructive to the project of 
Foucauldian critique, some writers have, nevertheless, hinted at a political orientation.  Here 
we return to the 1990s, for this was the decade that secured Foucault’s reception in the 
English-speaking world.  As Rose, O’Malley and Valverde (2006: 89) argue, this was the 
period in which the dominant ‘analytical framework of governmentality…assumed the form’ 
that ‘it takes today’.  Our claim is that the implicit politics we identify with this ‘analytical 
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framework’ still dominates the field today:  According to David Owen (1995: 501), the 
‘architectonic practical interest of genealogy’ is autonomy.  Thomas Osborne (1999: 47) 
speaks of ‘self-creation’, whilst Nikolas Rose, following his analysis of the ‘death of the 
social’ and apparent denial therefore of any politics that might be built from this (now absent) 
wellspring (Rose, 1996), suggests that in this post-social age ‘each person’s life should be its 
own telos’.  This would be the ‘minimal normativity’ to which he could subscribe (Rose, 
1999b: 283).  From this governmental perspective some ‘ways of governing are intolerable 
precisely because they exclude the possibility’ of self-formation (ibid.). 
 
The apparent individualism of these statements, which seem to indicate the 
persistence of a liberal humanist hankering after autonomous, free selfhood, suggests that 
these writers are unable to achieve sufficient critical distance from present-day political 
discourse.  Even within the governmentality school this has caused concern.  Mitchell Dean 
(2007: 86) has criticised some writers for appearing to ‘endorse’ liberalism as ‘relatively 
benign’, claiming that there is in their work a ‘narrowing of the relationship’ between a 
liberal approach to government and ‘the analysis offered by governmentality studies’.  Seen 
perhaps as somewhat of an outlier, Kevin Stenson (1998) spots the potential for an 
identification of the governmentalist project with liberal values, arguing that governmentality 
studies be deployed as a deliberate tool to reinforce liberalism and promote autonomy:  As 
defenders of ‘the most civilized tolerant framework of living yet devised’, members of this 
school should also set themselves against ‘radical critics’ who ‘may at times pose a threat to 
liberal values and principles’ (ibid.: 350).   
 
Whether Stenson embodies the underlying truth of the governmental position in the 
sense that his thinking performs a distillation to the fundamental assumptions of neo-
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Foucauldian critique, or represents a deviation from the vocation as suggested by Dean, there 
is likely to be a basic difficulty with this school of thought.  The Foucauldian version of the 
subject, as elaborated in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002f[1969b]), is ‘a 
radically decentred subject whose conditions of existence are relational, dispersed, never 
finally given’ (Goddard, 2010: 351).  There are telling affinities here with the 
liberal/neoliberal subject, the individual best fitted for performance under the conditions of an 
advanced global capitalism, a subject that is endlessly adaptable, flexible and rootless.  Small 
wonder, perhaps, that neo-Foucauldians find it difficult to put a space between themselves 
and the neoliberal scheme of things.  This affinity all too often limits neo-Foucauldian 
research to descriptive analysis and renders it incapable, it seems, of anything like a vigorous 
political critique. 
 
Perhaps all this should come as no surprise.  After all, what sort of resistance does 
power-as-government imply?  In 1978 following his switch to the analysis of power-as-
government, Foucault offered a succinct definition:  alongside a ‘multiplication of all the arts 
of governing’ there has developed ‘the art of not being governed so much’.  This, we are told, 
is the ‘preliminary definition of critique’ (Foucault, 1996b[1978c]: 384).  It is a definition of 
critique that is notably close to the liberal order of discourse, which is preoccupied with the 
problem of too much government, of inserting economy into political practice (Foucault, 
2008[1979b]).  Indeed, Foucault is quite clear that this critical attitude, the art of not being 
governed so much, ‘is at once partner and adversary of the arts of government’.  This critical 
attitude is both a means of challenging the arts of government, and a way of refining them by 
‘finding their right measure’ (Foucault, 1996b[1978c]: 384).   
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The governmentalist conception of critique is, therefore, ambiguous in its very 
constitution, as Foucault makes abundantly clear.  This ambiguity continues to be expressed 
in the work of his followers.  In his exposition of the ethics and politics of the later Foucault, 
Osborne (1999: 53) puts it like this: to the extent that Foucault had a political orientation, it 
was based ‘not on our status as human beings but on our status as governed beings’.  Whilst 
‘we may not share an essence, a soul, an identity or any other fixed attributes with others’ 
Rose adds, ‘there is one status that we do share, and that is our status as subjects of 
government’ (Rose, 1999b: 284).  Rose declares that we even ‘have the right, as governed 
subjects’ to contest the practices that govern us in the name of freedom (ibid.: 59-60).  The 
idea of a ‘right’ in this context has a specific meaning and does not necessarily imply an 
essential humanism, according to which we are somehow born with inalienable rights.  It is 
only the contingent fact that we are currently ‘subject to government’ that gives us the right 
to collectively ‘resist government’ (Osborne, 1999: 54).  Foucault puts this a little more 
strongly than his followers when he states that we are ‘obliged to show mutual solidarity’ as 
‘members of the community of the governed’ (Foucault, 2002g[1984b]: 474-5).  
 
For us, the difficulty with this formulation of the critical enterprise is that it is 
promoted by a neo-Foucauldian tradition of research that also employs a highly diffuse and 
pluralistic conception of government.  If anything defines the governmentality school, it is 
the claim that neoliberal times are not available to representation as a monolithic regime of 
power.  The wish not to be governed ‘so much’ is thus provided with few resources for 
refusal from within this conceptual frame.  The risk here is that the current order of things 
finds its fragmented reflection in a myriad of minor personal rebellions, reifying the 
individualising absorption of each and all within his or her own fashioning of self.  Such a 
conceptualisation of the critical enterprise would sustain the operations of what post-
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Foucauldian governmentalism declines to recognise as a very real and dangerous regime of 
power, the neoliberal doctrine that licences the actions of globalised capitalism.  Of course, 
this is also a regime that is more varied in its forms, its instrumentalities and its co-ordinating 
impulses than a global critique can comprehend. 
 
We would argue that the analytic perspective afforded by a concept of power-as-war 
entails a practice of critique that has far greater potential for challenging existing 
dispensations of power in general, and, in particular, for interrupting liberal complacencies, 
than the generally acquiescent formula described above.  The real advantage of power-as-war 
is that it emphasises the basic Foucauldian point, which is that when peace arrives, so does 
domination.  If a Foucauldian critique of power has any normative content worth pursuing, 
this should be located in:  
 
(i) An overall suspicion of peaceful appearances: where benign peace is just a cover for 
‘blood that has dried on the codes’ (Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 56), and despotic peace is 
the same wound but without the bandages.  
(ii) A qualified promotion of militancy: rejecting militancy that either embodies a tendency 
to peace or a tendency to domination.   
 
This position need not contradict the governmental wish to be governed less.  However, it 
does imply an important switch in emphasis, from individual subjective resistance to 
collective material refusal, from a personal desire to take control over the practices that form 
the self, to a communal project that seeks to promote disorder and introduce greater tactical 
polyvalence to those practices of self-production. 
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From ‘Why Fight’ to ‘How Fight?’ 
 
If one knows how to move, the absence of a schema is not an obstacle but 
an opportunity. (The Invisible Committee, 2009: 19) 
 
It might be productive to begin with the strategic question ‘How Fight?’.  That is, what 
would be the conditions of conflict most suited to Foucauldian critique?  This would avoid 
what Foucault referred to as Enlightenment blackmail, a form of conceptual trickery that 
imposes the constraints of ‘a simplistic and authoritarian alternative’ (Foucault, 
2000b[1984a]: 313).  To begin by asking whether a historically contingent, embattled and 
anti-foundational form of critique can ever answer Habermas’s normative ultimatum, ‘Why 
Fight?’ is to set out in the wrong direction.  It presumes access to a trans-historical, 
evaluative position or figure.  Foucault’s reply is that we should become ‘less concerned with 
why this or that than with how to proceed’ (Foucault, 2007b[1972b]: xiv). 
 
Described as ‘the first key move’ of a Foucauldian analysis of power, this switch 
‘from why to how’ (Miller and Rose, 2008: 8) has been applied elsewhere to effect a ‘breach 
of self-evidence…making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke 
a historical constant’.  To ask why things occur entails questions such as:  Who invented this 
technique?  What wider social process does it represent (capitalism, social disintegration, 
modernisation, class conflict etc)?  Whose interests does it favour?  And so on.  By contrast, 
Foucault (2002b[1978a]: 226-7) adopts a resolutely descriptive tone in explicating the ‘how’ 
of power, seeking a ‘multiplication or pluralisation of causes’. 
 
Applying this logic to its own enterprise, we might argue that neo-Foucauldian 
scholarship should not begin by telling us why it generates a particular form of critique (i.e. 
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whether it is for emancipation, human rights, equality, autonomy, freedom etc.).  Instead, it 
could investigate how we could better practise critique, what are the conditions conducive to 
the critical enterprise.  The issue of normativity does not vanish, but it is deferred.  It is no 
longer assumed that why comes first, or that to answer why provides the necessary foundation 
upon which all else must rest.  The challenge now, is to develop new normative commitments 
through collective struggle and deliberation.  It is to operate without the restraints and 
rationales imposed by a pre-existing normative political programme, which will always 
presume too much, sharing in its formation many aspects of the regime to be overthrown. 
 
So how does a Foucauldian critic fight?  In what has become a powerfully influential 
mode of engagement in Foucauldian scholarship, the Foucauldian critic barely fights at all.  
The typical neo-Foucauldian scholar ordinarily remains distant from struggle, urging caution, 
intellectual modesty and analytic reserve.   
 
There are, nevertheless, occasional gestures in the governmental corpus towards a 
collective project, a potentially unifying Foucauldian praxis, but these gestures are rare and 
often highly tentative.  For example, towards the end of his paper on Foucault’s critical ethos, 
Lemke (2011) situates Foucault’s enterprise within the context of a common ‘normative 
horizon’, which, by implication must make the activity of critique a common endeavour.  
Even though Foucault’s critical ethos will continue to operate without a ‘substantive idea of 
the “good life’’’, our shared existential horizon means that such anti-foundational critique is 
never, purely, ‘an individual option’ (ibid.: 38).   The weakness of this position, for us, is that 
it remains subservient to a social and political horizon that defines where and when political 
issues become collective concerns.  Whilst Lemke, in a penultimate paragraph, hints at a role 
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for ‘passion and desire’ in driving critique, the precise role of passion, and its relation to 
critique remains unexamined (ibid.: 40).    
 
Despite occasional moments such as these, the over-riding tendency has been to 
‘point to a certain modesty in Foucault’s conception of political activism’ (Osborne, 1999: 
55).  This modest attitude rejects, as Osborne argues, ‘a need much trumpeted today – 
namely, for a new ‘big idea’ to help us into the next millennium’ (ibid.: 56) and recommends 
instead a more inventive ‘stylisation of oneself – as an individual or as a collectivity – in 
relation to government’ (ibid.: 54).  Again, these are passing remarks without any connection 
to political praxis.  They are also limited, once again to a critical position that is subservient 
to a horizon defined by government.  
 
It is remarkable that even the foremost proponents of what is for us a tamed critical 
ethos, the ‘governmentality’ theorists in Britain and elsewhere, have been subjected to their 
own methodological critique.  They have been criticised for failures to exercise sufficient 
Foucauldian caution in their research.  It is clear that within this intellectual landscape, even 
the most devoutly cautious intellectual practitioners are not immune from attack.  Stephen 
Collier (2009) argues that governmental theorists are, despite their methodological intentions, 
still prone to global pronouncements.  A yet more ‘supple analysis’ is possible and necessary, 
one that shrinks still further from a ‘diagnostic style’ of thought given to ‘epochal 
announcements and totalizing claims’ (ibid.: 79-80).  Foucault himself, Collier claims, was 
prone to these attacks in his earlier work, and yet managed to restrain this impulse in his last 
years through a diligent investigation of ‘patterns of correlation in which heterogeneous 
elements – techniques, material forms, institutional structures and technologies of power – 
are configured’ (ibid.: 80).  This was the work of a more restrained Foucault, so the argument 
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goes, who explored assemblages of power and ‘broad configurational principles’ (ibid.).  This 
was a Foucault who had become resolutely descriptive, who had become analytically cool, no 
longer relying on implicit mythologies of oppression, nor appealing any more to a broader 
politics of refusal.   
 
A typical response to Collier would be to assert that Foucault was never given to 
epochal claims, or if he was, that these were minor slips in an abiding project of carefully 
measured statements.  Our position is somewhat different, as we sense a more consistent and 
enduring tendency in Foucault to combine meticulous investigation with the urgency born of 
a militant impulse that was never entirely disavowed.  Indeed this productive dissonance is, 
for us, what makes his work so engaging and provocative. 
 
Unlike Collier we would prefer to give the most eminent scholars of the 
‘governmentality’ school their due as having in many cases successfully achieved the critical 
distance they seek.  It is only regrettable that the critical enterprise they promote is the 
remainder of a more vigorous, once bolder form of engagement.  In the hands of its 
originating thinker and for a brief period during the early 1970s, this critical work formed a 
provocative and stimulating countervailing force against the tendencies towards revolutionary 
singularity, reductive theoretical unity, and transcendence found in the doctrines and politics 
of Marxism, Maoism and other radical Left movements of the post ‘68 era.  Foucault 
nevertheless felt that he had been too easily adopted by its self-styled radicals, and so towards 
the end of that decade, there was a lexical and analytic switch from the more openly militant 
terminology of ‘power, war and discipline’, to the more ambivalent terminology of 
‘governmentality, security and biopower’.  Those working with Foucault in the late seventies 
at the Collège de France welcomed this transition to what they saw as a more intellectually 
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sophisticated, less openly militant analytics of power.  Indeed, co-researchers Daniel Defert, 
François Ewald, Jacques Donzelot and Catherine Mevel were so comfortably embedded 
within this analytic frame that they were content to write genealogies of risk and insurance 
for the French Labour Ministry as the decade drew to a close.  In the late seventies Foucault’s 
new analytics of power had the unexpected effect of playing ‘an instrumental role in 
reconciling at least some members of the ’68 generation with contemporary society’ 
(Behrent, 2010: 617).  The Nietzschean impulse that first animated genealogy had been 
abandoned. 
 
We argue that decades later, in our radically different political context any critical 
endeavour that relies heavily on Foucault’s analytics of power should carefully re-examine its 
political strategy, or risk becoming ‘at its last gasp’ mere scholarship of a variety once 
castigated by Nietzsche (1998a[1886]: VI §204).  If organised militancy oriented towards a 
singular and despotic truth were to emerge once more, perhaps neo-Foucauldian critique, as a 
research project practised by a militant scholarly elite might be appropriate again.  An 
academic cadre could once more produce monographs that work to destroy or at least cast 
doubt on the simplistic tales of oppression and domination foisted on us by revolutionary 
teleologies.  But in the current climate this model of critical intervention is unable to function 
to any perceivable effect.  It has lost the foe against which it defines itself, the unifying 
militant project, which has disintegrated into ‘discontinuous, particular and local critiques’ 
(Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 6).  Neo-Foucauldian scholarship needs to adjust because, as its 
considerable outputs demonstrate, there is a far more dangerous phenomenon to be opposed 
than an anachronistic and superannuated leftist determinism – what Foucault might have 
termed a daemonic conjoining of instrumental rationalities and a reckless global capitalism 
that brings with it its own governmentalizing procedures and intentions.   
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Another kind of militant genealogy is required, one that has been updated to match 
the needs of the present.  Its militancy cannot be prescribed in advance; rather it must be 
invented through an engagement with the process of struggle itself.  Foucault was quite 
explicit on this point, arguing that: not only would ‘political analysis and critique…have to be 
invented’ (Foucault, 1996a[1977c]: 211), this would also be a ‘permanent political task’ 
(Foucault, 1983a: 223).  His analytical and conceptual innovations produced a line of supple, 
sensitive enquiry, which afforded a more detailed and rigorous examination and account of 
governmental power than anything hitherto achieved by radical critique.  This is a line of 
analysis along which governmentality studies continue to work. However, Foucault adds that 
the creation of new forms of political analysis and critique must be accompanied by the 
invention of ‘strategies that will allow both modifying these relations of force and 
coordinating them in such a way that this modification will be possible and register in reality’ 
(Foucault, 1996a[1977c]: 211).  This call for ‘new forms of politicization’ (ibid.) remains 
open and demands equal attention alongside the accompanying demand for new forms of 
analysis and critique.  Here we should avoid the temptation to adopt a division between 
political analysis and critique on the one hand and political action on the other.  This is a 
typical neo-Foucauldian tendency arising from excessive fidelity to Foucault’s well-known 
rejection of the ‘imperative discourse’ of universal intellectuals which ‘consists in saying 
‘strike against this and do so in this way” (Foucault, 2007a[1978d]: 3).  Foucault’s point here 
was that ‘the dimension of what is to be done can only appear within…a field of forces that 
cannot be created by a speaking subject alone and on the basis of his words’ (ibid.).  All this 
may be admitted, but it does not mean that critical scholarship should confine itself to 
descriptive analysis and oblique political observation.   
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Perhaps one of the most promising departures from the governmental preoccupation 
with investigating the ‘conduct of conduct’ is the recent focus on the accompanying 
importance of what Foucault later called ‘counter-conduct’ (Davidson, 2011).  Read through 
the lens of Foucault’s last lecture series at the Collège de France (Foucault, 2011[1984c]), 
counter-conduct is understood as a wilfully eccentric stylisation of one’s life that plays with 
and subverts dominant norms.  To some extent for the later Foucault, counter-conduct is to 
government, what resistance was to power.  This lexical switch is nevertheless significant 
insofar as it draws attention to the specifically disruptive ethos of embodied and perverse 
activities.   This is a welcome addition to the dissident repertoire, and yet in a liberal regime 
such perversions are often too easily absorbed.  The obvious danger with counter-cultural 
styles of life is that these modes of life always risk becoming accepted by a liberal order of 
discourse that prides itself on its apparent permissiveness.  By contrast, a wilfully militant 
genealogy would ensure that insubordinate activities remain unacceptable to existing 
dispensations of power.  This genealogy would pay close attention to existing struggles in an 
effort to broaden their scope, enhance their sensitivity to operations of power, and draw 
attention to attempts at co-option.   
 
A wilfully militant genealogy would certainly cast off the intellectual restraints of 
prominent neo-Foucauldians who cloak their enquiries in a determined penitence for the 
grand and global claims of an erstwhile radicalism.  As we argue above, one way of 
understanding this scholarly tradition is to view it as a reactive formation to the bombastic 
grandiosity of lockstep Marxism, in a former time the passionate attachment of many of the 
post-Foucauldians to whom we refer (see Frankel, 1997).
10
  Our feeling is that such persistent 
self-chastisement and self-limitation has involved living according to a rule that has blunted 
consideration of political possibility.  Here a return to power-as-war would reinvigorate 
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analysis and give it greater purchase on political actualities.  As a conceptual frame it calls 
attention to the quality of struggle.  In our current climate, this entails working towards the 
construction of new forms of refusal and subversion after a long period of Left militant 
decline and strategic realignment.  This would involve an investigation of the material 
conditions that are required to support, maintain and assist militant work, an investigation 
that would include genealogies of previous struggles, looking in particular at those that are 
relatively unfettered by theoretical globalisms, and are locally situated and responsive to the 
immediate logic of events.   
 
In calling attention to the quality of struggle we are not suggesting that struggle or 
disorder should be elevated for its own sake as an ontological principle and goal.  Rather, the 
task for genealogy today is to investigate the conditions that are required to enhance the 
potential for a more incisive and practically influential critique of a Foucauldian kind.  That 
is, a model of political intervention that is careful to avoid simplistic, undiscriminating (or 
wholesale) condemnations of power, a type of oppositional practice that is open to counter-
intuitive and anti-foundational critique, a militancy that attends to the multiple, diffuse and 
unexpected ways in which power conditions our daily lives and forms us as myopic, docile 
subjects, wedded in the very formation of our character to the systems which oppress us.  
This would be a kind of militancy that no longer has the convenience of a well-defined foe.  
It would be a militancy that has come to terms with the basic Foucauldian insight that there is 
no single agent or agentic force that is to blame, that there is no one motor of history, no 
unique engine of human suffering, no single exploiter or antagonist against which militancy 
must mobilise itself.  Militancy must come to terms with all that, and yet remain mobilised, 
convinced as it is of the continued existence of suffering and exploitation, and of the 
necessity of fighting against it. 
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Through its opposition to the teleological schemes of twentieth century emancipatory 
thought and activism, Foucauldian critique once attempted to provide revolutionary discourse 
with those perspectives and tools that would liberate it from theoretical globalism’s.  Today, 
by contrast, it must establish a different and closer relation to militancy.  The disorganisation 
of militant work, which has become both a fact of struggle and at times a normative ideal, 
demands an adjusted form of political enquiry from the Left.   
 
The distinctive contribution of work that takes its inspiration from Foucault should be 
to commit its subtle and nuanced armoury to this effort.  The Foucauldian challenge, as we 
perceive it, is to augment governmental analysis with the insights and provocations of a war 
analytic, translated into (i) a suspicion of peaceful appearances and (ii) a qualified promotion 
of militancy.  The academic monographs of the post-Foucauldian academic still deserve 





1. Even here, liberal-democratic sensibilities can be upset, for example, by the claim that 
several months after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, protestors 
were dying in Tahrir square because the original revolution was not violent enough.  
In other words, ‘revolution must strike [at least] twice’ (Žižek, 2011: 7). 
2. ‘I often quote concepts texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to 
add the authenticating label of a footnote’.  ‘Nowadays I prefer to remain silent about 
Nietzsche’ (Foucault, 1980d[1975b]: 52-3). 
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3. This interview was conducted in June 1976. 
4. See for example: Burchell et al. (1991), Barry et al. (1996), Miller and Rose (2008) 
and Dean (1999). 
5. Exceptions can be found outside this paradigm.  See for example, Thiele (1990). 
6. See Macey (2008: 129). ‘It was not exactly racist discourse whose history I was 
tracing and that I was praising: it was the discourse of race war or race struggle’ 
(Foucault, 2004[1976b]: 65). 
7. For more detail see Foucault (2004[1976b]: 58-9, 60, 78-9, 88 and 111). 
8. For more detail see: Foucault (2004[1976b]: 83, 261-3; 1980c[1977d]: 223-5). 
9. See, for example, Kelly (1994) and Ashenden and Owen (1999).  More recently, 
efforts have been made to search for common ground between Habermas and 
Foucault, though it is recognised that such an approach involves recasting the views 
of both Allen (2009). 
10. For a retrospective account of how these neo-Marxist tendencies were overcome by 
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